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Abstract Early reputation systems use simple computation
metrics that can easily be manipulated by malicious actors.
Advanced computation models that mitigate their weak-
nesses, however, are non-transparent to the end-users thus
lowering their understandability and the users’ trust
towards the reputation system. The paper proposes the
concept of interactive reputation systems that combine the
cognitive capabilities of the user with the advantages of
robust metrics while preserving the system’s transparency.
Results of the evaluation show that interactive reputation
systems increase both the users’ detection ability (robust-
ness) and understanding of malicious behavior while
avoiding trade-offs in usability.
Keywords Trust  reputation systems  Information
security  Visual analytics
1 Introduction
Reputation systems are an essential component of various
online platforms such as electronic marketplaces, e-com-
merce websites, or file-sharing systems. Since these envi-
ronments usually involve a huge number of strangers who
have not interacted before, users do not have any infor-
mation about e.g. the trustworthiness of a seller or the
quality of a product – ex ante. To solve this problem,
reputation systems encourage users to provide feedback on
past experiences. They then compute one or several repu-
tation values and display the output in an actor’s or item’s
feedback profile. In this way, users can establish trust based
on the experiences made by others (Resnick et al. 2000;
Awad and Ragowsky 2008).
In the recent years, this simple concept has even gen-
erated websites that particularly focus on collecting
reviews for different use cases such as tripadvisor1 or
yelp2. The success of these websites is hardly surprising, as
researchers have been able to provide empirical evidence
that reputation systems manage to reduce information
asymmetry and increase a market’s efficiency (Dellarocas
2001; Yamagishi and Matsuda 2002). On eBay, sellers with
better reputation even have an increased number of sales
and obtain higher prices (Diekmann et al. 2013). While the
concomitant economic value of ‘‘good’’ reputation
encourages trustworthy participation, it also offers an
enticement for malicious actors to exploit the weaknesses
of reputation systems in order to appear more rep-
utable than appropriate. For that reason, the robustness3 of
reputation systems has become a focal issue in the trust
management research community (Jøsang 2012).
Since most early reputation systems could easily be
manipulated, researchers have started to introduce a large
number of computation models that are robust against a
variety of different attacks. In most cases, these models are
based on advanced mathematics and have thus becomeAccepted after two revisions by Prof. Dr. Jarke.
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quite complex (Marsh et al. 2012). High complexity and
resulting non-transparency, however, lower the users’ trust
towards the reputation systems (Hammer et al. 2013). In
practice, in contrast, this trend to more robust computation
models have not taken effect. Common electronic mar-
ketplaces such as eBay4 or e-commerce websites like
Amazon5 still use a very simple and easy to understand
metric. Such reputation systems, in turn, have been shown
to be very weak against several attacks.
To close the gap between robust metrics introduced in
literature and transparent and easy to understand user
interfaces mostly used in practice, we propose the concept
of interactive reputation systems. Involving the user in
reputation assessment, interactive reputation systems aim
at providing enhanced insights through combining the
cognitive capabilities and the experience of the users with
the advantages of robust reputation metrics. While there
has been considerable work on certain building blocks of
interactive reputation systems [(e.g. modularizing and
configuring the computation (Hillebrand and Coetzee
2015; Sänger et al. 2015c) or displaying reputation data in
interactive visualizations (Sänger et al. 2015b)], the work
presented in this paper is the first to the best of our
knowledge that connects the distinct building blocks to
introduce the complete and integrated concept of interac-
tive reputation systems.
The remainder of this paper is based on the design sci-
ence research paradigm (Hevner et al. 2004) following the
phases introduced by Peffers et al. (2007) (problem iden-
tification and motivation, objective of the solution, design
and development, demonstration, evaluation, communica-
tion): first, we describe the background of online trust and
reputation systems as well as robust metrics and transpar-
ent presentation in Sect. 2 (problem identification and
motivation). Based on that, we point out the research gap
and define the objectives of our work (objective of the
solution). In Sect. 3 we introduce the concept of interactive
reputation systems. Here, we propose the process model
and describe how the single building blocks can be inte-
grated (design and development). To demonstrate how
interactive reputation systems could look in practice we
present a software prototype (demonstration). In order to
evaluate the quality of our solution, we conducted several
experiments as well as an international user study that are
described in Sect. 4 (evaluation). Results show that through
involving the user in reputation assessment, attacks on
reputation systems can be reliably detected while main-
taining the system’s transparency. In this way, the users’
understanding of malicious behavior can be enhanced.
Finally we sum up our contribution and discuss the
implications of our findings in the Sect. 5
(communication).
2 Background and Objectives
2.1 Online Trust and Reputation Systems
The concept of trust has been studied in research for many
years. While the emergence of the Internet and e-com-
merce is a quite recent phenomenon, the research on trust
spans a wide area of further disciplines such as sociology,
psychology or economics (Riegelsberger et al. 2005).
Consequently, there are just as many definitions and
researchers even disagree on basic characteristics
(McKnight and Chervany 1996; Gefen et al. 2003). In this
work, we refer to the definition of reliability trust by
Gambetta (1988) that is commonly used in the trust man-
agement research community: ‘‘trust is the subjective
probability with which an agent assesses that another
agent will perform a particular action in a context in which
it affects his own action’’.
In search of a value describing Gambetta’s subjective
probability or what is called trustworthiness, reputation is
often used as a measure (Jøsang et al. 2007). Reputation-
based trust is deduced from past experiences or behavior of
an entity. Since a common online environment may
involve millions of actors, it can be difficult to determine a
person’s reputation manually. For this reason, reputation
systems have become popular tools to support reputation
assessment. Reputation systems encourage users to leave
feedback, e.g., about the performance of a seller or the
quality of a product. They then collect all feedback created,
aggregate the ratings to compute one or several reputation
values and present the output in a feedback profile (Resnick
et al. 2000). Figure 1 depicts the generic process of a
reputation system. Here, we also added the user who
employs the reputation system to come to a decision (e.g.
whether to buy or not to buy from a specific seller).
2.2 Exploiting Reputation Systems
Since the early works of Marsh (1994) on trust as a com-
putational concept, many researchers have been able to
provide empirical evidence for positive effects of
Fig. 1 Generic process of a reputation system
4 http://www.ebay.com.
5 http://www.amazon.com.
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reputation systems in online communities (Resnick and
Zeckhauser 2002; Houser and Wooders 2006). In elec-
tronic marketplaces, for example, reputable sellers generate
price premiums and have an increased number of sales (Ba
and Pavlou 2002; Resnick et al. 2006; Diekmann et al.
2013). This offers an enticement for malicious actors to
exploit the weaknesses of reputation systems in order to
unfairly improve their position.
In the recent years, a huge variety of different attacks on
reputation systems has been described in literature (Jøsang
and Golbeck 2009; Sun and Liu 2012). In order to give a
structured overview of weaknesses, Koutrouli and Tsal-
gatidou (2012) identified three classes of attacks, namely
unfair feedback, inconsistent behavior and identity-based
attacks. In unfair feedback attacks, malicious peers provide
many unfairly high or low ratings to e.g. push the reputa-
tion of a friend or destroy the reputation of a competitor
(Dellarocas 2000). The second class – inconsistent behav-
ior – involves attacks that benefit from the characteristics
of specific computation metrics. In reputation systems that
do not consider transaction context, for instance, a mali-
cious actor could show a discriminating behavior in dif-
ferent situations such as selling high quality chewing gum
but low quality laptops. Thirdly, identity-based attacks
primarily address systems that allow cheap pseudonyms.
Table 1 gives an overview of selected example attacks.
To cope with the weaknesses of early reputation sys-
tems, a large body of work on the design of new trust
models and robust metrics has been published (Artz and
Gil 2007; Koutrouli and Tsalgatidou 2012; Sun and Liu
2012). While most early computation models could easily
be manipulated by malicious actors, current models (par-
ticularly those introduced in literature) are quite resistant
against a variety of attacks.
2.3 Robust Metrics vs. Transparent Presentation
A reputation system is deemed robust if it always delivers a
higher reputation value for an honest actor than for a
malicious actor in case of an attack (Zhang et al. 2012b). In
order to increase the robustness of reputation systems,
researchers have introduced a large number of complex
computation models in the recent years. These are usually
based on advanced mathematics using e.g. beta probability
density functions, hidden markov models or complex
clustering algorithms. Table 2 gives an overview of
selected examples.
Admittedly, these sophisticated models are more robust
when attacked, however, they are beyond the understand-
ing of the users intended to apply them in most cases
(Marsh et al. 2012). One or several numerical values as
only outcomes of the computation process are in general
not sufficiently transparent to the end-user as they cannot
convey any details about the exact input data (e.g. which
reviews were considered, which not?) leading to a cogni-
tive gap. A recent user study conducted by Hammer et al.
(2013) in which they compared two reputation metrics was
able to show that more than half of the participants
Table 1 Example attacks on reputation systems
Attack class Name Description
Unfair
feedback
Ballot stuffing The attacker provides many high ratings to unfairly push the reputation of an entity
Bad mouthing The attacker provides many low ratings to unfairly destroy the reputation of an entity
Inconsistent
behavior
Value imbalance
exploitation
The attackers gathers good reputation selling cheap items, but at the same time cheats on the expensive
ones
On-off attack The attackers first acts honestly to build high reputation, than ‘‘milks’’ the good reputation. After a
certain threshold value is reached, he behaves honestly again and starts from the beginning
Identity-based Whitewashing The attacker behaves maliciously from the beginning. After he has received negative ratings, he opens
a new account
Sybil-attack The attacker creates many accounts (Sybils) at the same time to increase his influence in a community
Table 2 Example reputation models
Name Author Formal basis
Beta reputation system, TRAVOS Jøsang and Ismail (2002), Teacy et al. (2006) Beta probability density functions (PDF)
iClub Liu et al. (2011) Clustering-based model
Evidential model Yu and Singh (2002) Belief model, Dempster-Shafer theory
Web services reputation Malik et al. (2009) Hidden Markov Model
REGRET Sabater and Sierra (2001) Fuzzy model
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criticized this lack of transparency if they were not able to
understand the computation.
When analyzing reputation systems in practice, how-
ever, this trend to ever more robust computation models is
not reflected (particularly in e-commerce). Most prominent
reputation systems, such as eBay’s feedback mechanism or
Amazon’s customer review system, still use a very simple
and easy to understand metric to provide an overview of
the ratings. eBay’s reputation value shows the share of
positive feedback of the overall feedback, while Amazon
provides the average rating value on a five-star scale.
Figure 2 depicts these two examples.
Though these metrics are easy to understand, they are
highly vulnerable to different kinds of attacks as pointed
out in several works (Kerr and Cohen 2009; Hoffman et al.
2009; Yao et al. 2012).
2.4 Research Gap and Objectives
Based on the problems identified above, the main research
question (RQ) addressed in this work is stated as follows:
RQ. How can the robustness of reputation systems be
enhanced without reducing both transparency and the
user’s understanding of reputation data?
Most research conducted to increase the robustness of
reputation systems in the recent years focused on the
improvement of the computation phase (see Fig. 1). While
advanced computation models may provide an effective
remedy against malicious behavior, they have been shown to
be non-transparent to the end-user. Transparent interfaces
using simple computation models, in contrast, are non-robust
against attacks. We believe that only through combining
both sides of the coin, an effective detecting and under-
standing of malicious behavior can be achieved (see Fig. 3).
To this end, we take a different path to increase the
robustness of reputation systems: instead of designing a
further improved computation model we integrate compu-
tation and presentation through user interaction. By incor-
porating the visual-cognitive capabilities of a human user
and the computing power of a machine, we think that mali-
cious behavior can be reliably and transparently identified.
Our objectives when introducing this concept are:
Fig. 2 a eBay’s and
b Amazon’s overview
Fig. 3 Robust metrics vs.
transparent presentation
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1. To increase the user’s ability to detect attacks on
reputation systems (robustness), and
2. to enhance the user’s understanding of reputation data.
2.5 Research Approach
When designing a complex artifact, there may not be a
definite final condition at the beginning. In line with the
human problem solving approach (Newell 1972), the
analysis of a design problem therefore involves the suc-
cessive decomposition to sub-problems until they seem
solvable, followed by a final composition of the single sub-
solutions to an overall solution (Chandrasekaran 1990).
With this in mind, we first decomposed the overall problem
to two sub-problems, each addressing one of the two cen-
tral phases of the generic process of a reputation system:
computation and presentation. On the one hand, we elab-
orated on the question of how the computation could be re-
designed as an interactive process (Sänger et al. 2015a, c).
On the other hand, we analyzed how reputation data could
be presented to involve the user in reputation assessment
(Sänger and Pernul 2014, 2016; Sänger et al. 2015b). In
these previous works, however, the two phases – compu-
tation and presentation – were considered as isolated
building blocks.
In this paper, we go one step beyond the state of the art
by connecting the results of our recent works (sub-solu-
tions) and introduce the overall concept of interactive
reputation systems. Only after combining the findings
made for the respective blocks, the idea of involving the
user in reputation assessment through interaction can take
full effect. First, we will introduce and define the notion of
an interactive reputation system and describe the process
model. Second, based on the findings made for interactive
computation and interactive presentation, we will integrate
both blocks on a conceptual level. After that, we show what
an interactive reputation system could look in a real-world
environment by means of a software prototype and evalu-
ate this concept as to the objectives defined above.
3 Interactive Reputation Systems
3.1 Process Model
A classical reputation system delivers static numerical
reputation values as output. Though the user interface may
provide some filters to read specific reviews (e.g. only
negative feedback), the reputation value is not adjusted.
A few novel reputation systems that have emerged in the
recent years, however, provide the possibility to adapt
single settings and reflect these changes accordingly in the
reputation value. Tripadvisor, for example, allows the users
to focus on reviews provided by a specific peer group (e.g.
families, business travelers, etc.), filters the corresponding
reviews and displays an aggregated reputation value that
only involves ratings of the selected group. We call such
systems interactive reputation systems, since unlike static
systems these systems encourage the user to interact and
adapt the computation levers in order to gain enhanced
insights. Based on this, the definition of an interactive
reputation system as used in this work is as follows:
Definition An interactive reputation system is a reputa-
tion system that allows the users to dynamically adapt the
underlying computation mechanism.
Reviewing the process model of a classical reputation
system as introduced in Sect. 2.1, a user who may inter-
actively adapt the computation is not considered. To depict
this coherence for an interactive reputation system, the
process model of a static system needs to be extended by a
bilateral flow between the user and the computation via the
presentation interface as depicted in Fig. 4.
Exactly as in the process model of a classical reputation
system (see Fig. 1), data is collected in the first step.
Second, both the raw data as well as models of the data
calculated in the computation are presented to the end-user.
Ideally, a very intuitive metric such as the average rating
value is used in the initial computation to provide a
transparent starting point for further analyses. On eBay, for
instance, a list of the textual reviews (raw data), the share
of positive ratings and an aggregation of positive, neutral
and negative ratings for specific time-frames (models) are
presented in the feedback profile interface. In an interactive
reputation system, the user can then ‘‘interact’’ with the
visual representation of the reputation profile e.g. through
adapting computation settings, thus changing the models
that are computed. Typical interaction techniques include
the filtering of unnecessary reviews, adding of weighting
rules or changing of the entire aggregation metrics. The
inherent user-driven definition of the calculation rules will
Fig. 4 Generic process of an interactive reputation system
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logically lead to a clearer understanding of the models
computed.6
3.2 Conceptual Design
When starting to plan an interactive reputation system as
introduced above, several decisions need to be made.
While there is no need to adapt the collection, the design of
the computation and presentation must be completely
revised compared to a classical reputation system. Here,
two major design decisions were necessary:
1. Computation: To transform the computation mecha-
nism from static to dynamic in a way that it may be
interactively adapted by the user, we chose a modular
design that allows to dynamically add and remove
components.
2. Presentation: The user-friendly and transparent pre-
sentation of reputation data is a vital requirement to
guarantee the proper understanding of the information
provided to the end-user. Adding interactive visual-
izations of reputation data to the user interface
provides a promising alternative to overcome the
shortcomings of a single numerical value and link
computation and presentation.
3.2.1 Computation
If the computation mechanism is modularized, a user will
be able to dynamically compose a computation model
through adding, removing and adapting components that
implement specific functionality. To this end, the general
building blocks of the computation models used in com-
mon reputation systems were identified first. Here, all well-
established systems described in literature on trust models
were analyzed. Based on their characteristics, a hierarchi-
cal taxonomy of computation components was developed
as depicted in Fig. 5.
On the primary level it involves the three primary
classes ‘‘filtering’’, ‘‘weighting’’ and ‘‘aggregation’’.
Obviously, the first task when assessing reputation is to
filter all information available for what is relevant for the
specific situation. Secondly, the significance of single
referrals needs to be determined such that e.g. very new
feedback might be treated as more relevant than very old
feedback (weighting). Finally the input data is aggregated
to provide a final output (e.g. reputation value). Based on
these three main classes, 14 secondary component classes,
26 components and 36 subsets were identified (Sänger
et al. 2015c). Here, the components and sub-sets represent
examples of how the functional blocks were instantiated in
different trust models. The secondary class ‘‘simple arith-
metic’’, for instance, contains components that implement
different simple aggregation techniques such as the ‘‘av-
erage rating value’’ or the ‘‘share of positive ratings’’.
Secondly, we implemented a component repository that
stores an example implementation and a structured
6 This process model is strongly inspired by the visual analytics
process model that tries to combine the visual-cognitive capabilities
of a human analyst and the computing power of a machine (Keim
et al. 2010).
Fig. 5 Classes of filtering-,
weighting- and aggregation-
techniques (Sänger et al. 2015c)
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description (ID, type, URL, parameter, example call,
example output) of each component as reusable web ser-
vices.7 The component repository (centrally stored) is
publicly available and encourages researchers to add novel
components and extend existing ideas. All web services
implement well-defined interfaces and can easily be called
using the ‘‘WebserviceCallHelper’’ – a helper class avail-
able on the repository website.
By dynamically combining these components through
interaction (adding, removing or adapting), a user can
compose his individual computation mechanism on-the-fly.
To recreate Tripadvisor’s computation mechanism, for
instance, only the two components ‘‘context-based filter’’
and ‘‘average rating value’’ of the classes ‘‘filtering (pri-
mary class), attribute-based filter (secondary class)’’ and
‘‘aggregation (primary class), simple arithmetic (secondary
class)’’ need to be selected and composed. Overall, over
170,000 distinct combinations of the computation compo-
nents are possible.
3.2.2 Presentation
A numerical value as only outcome of the computation
lacks transparency. Therefore, we chose a different path by
additionally developing an integrated visual representation
of reputation data using interactive visualizations (Sänger
and Pernul 2016). Visualizations are very convenient to
depict a wide range of information in one integrated view.
To this end, the data structure of reputation data used in
electronic marketplaces was analyzed and all different
facets of reputation data were classified according to their
data type. Here, we could identify three main information
blocks – feedback, transaction context and actors. The
resulting classification of reputation data within each block
builds the basis for the selection of suitable visualization
and interaction techniques. The first block ‘‘feedback’’, for
instance, usually contains the three items rating (uni-vari-
ate), review text (textual) and feedback time (time-based
uni-variate). Figure 6 gives an overview of different
example visualizations suited for distinct types of reputa-
tion data.
3.2.3 Integrating Computation and Presentation
‘‘[...] if complex models are used in the background for
whatever reason, the user interface has a role to make the
model understandable without losing any of its predictive
power’’ (Marsh et al. 2012). In our recent research, com-
putation and presentation were mostly considered as iso-
lated blocks. However, the models that are computed based
on the modular mechanism described above also need to be
presented in a way the user may understand. Here, inter-
active visualizations offer a perfectly suitable technique as
the intermediate outcomes of filtering, weighting and the
final aggregated reputation value can be represented in the
user interface. Due to the standardized interfaces of the
computation components implemented as web services, the
output of filtering, weighting and aggregation is indepen-
dent of the functional behavior of the particular component
7 http://trust.bayforsec.de/ngot/index.php?section=service_
repository.
Fig. 6 Example visualizations of reputation data: a bar chart showing
the relative share of positive, neutral and negative ratings (uni-variate
data), b parallel coordinates displaying ratings and the corresponding
transaction context (multi-variate data), c stack graph depicting the
distribution of ratings of time (timed-based uni-variate data),
d reputation matrix revealing the feedback relations (network data)
and e colored tag cloud giving an overview of feedback texts (textual
data)
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but exactly alike for components of each primary class. In
order to integrate computation and presentation, visual-
izations must therefore be extended to the ability to rep-
resent the outcomes of the respective computation step.
To give an example, let us set the following scenario: A
reputation system used in an electronic market place should
be adapted to enable the interactive representation of a
reputation value with regard to the transaction context. To
compute the reputation value, we initially use the ‘‘share of
positive ratings’’ aggregation component on the computa-
tion layer. To display reputation data on the presentation
layer, we choose a parallel coordinates (PA) visualization
that shows ratings and the corresponding transaction con-
text. Parallel coordinates is a visualization technique that is
perfectly suitable for giving an overview of and revealing
correlations within a multi-variate dataset (Heinrich and
Weiskopf 2013). Here, four axes (each representing one of
the context attributes rating, price, year, and product cat-
egory) are layed out in parallel side by side (Inselberg
1985). Values on these axes are then connected by colored
polylines, each displaying one tuple of the dataset. Figure 7
shows a feedback profile of a seller who received 7 positive
and 2 negative ratings leading to a share of 77.7% positive
ratings (right). PA (left) display the raw data (ratings and
corresponding transaction context).
While Fig. 7 gives a general overview of seller feed-
back, the user/buyer might want to know what kind of
feedback the seller received for the product category
‘‘stamps’’ as he plans to buy stamps. Through clicking on
the category ‘‘stamps’’ label on the fourth axis of the
interactive visualization, all feedback not attributed to
stamps is blinded out. On the computation layer, selecting
ranges on the scales is equivalent to adding a context-based
filter that filters all feedback but that related to the selected
attributes. Adding this component, the reputation value is
dynamically updated to 50% positive ratings (see Fig. 8).
Finally, the buyer wants to focus on high price stamps.
Through clicking on the ‘‘price’’ label, a weighting factor
ranging from [0;1] is added to each rating (0 for the lower
end and 1 for the upper end of the scale). Accordingly, the
opacity of the polylines is adapted. On computation level,
this is equivalent to adding a context-based weighting
Fig. 7 Starting situation:
reputation data is displayed in
the GUI using a parallel
coordinates visualization
accompanied by the share of
positive ratings
Fig. 8 Step 1: An attribute-based filtering component is added to focus on feedback regarding stamps
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component. The corresponding reputation value is again
dynamically updated to 30.2% positive ratings (see Fig. 9).
This example reveals that displaying reputation data in
an interactive visualization and encouraging the user to add
filtering and weighting rules through user interaction may
notably increase the transparency and understanding of a
rather complex computation model. If a reputation value of
30.2% based on a context-aware metric was provided ini-
tially, in contrast, a huge variety of potentially useful and
interesting information would have been omitted. It would
neither be clear which reviews were filtered nor which
weighting factors were allocated to the different ratings.
3.3 Implementation
3.3.1 A Generic Software Framework
To demonstrate how interactive reputation systems could
look in a practical environment, we implemented a soft-
ware framework that allows to combine the component
model on the computation layer (see Sect. 3.2.1) with
interactive visualizations on the presentation layer (see
Sect. 3.2.2). The framework was designed as a three-tier
web application. On the data layer, we employed Couch-
base8 (NoSQL database) and MySQL (both can be used
interchangeably, each having its advantages for different
analyses). The logic layer was implemented using PHP
with the framework Laravel9 on server side and JavaScript
with AngularJS10 on client side. For the presentation we
used HTML5, JavaScript and CSS. The data visualization
was realized with the JavaScript library d3.js.11 d3 is per-
fectly suitable for creating and manipulating documents
based on a huge range of data. Figure 10 gives a schematic
overview of the architecture.
Taking a closer look at the detailed architecture of the
logic layer, we find two main building blocks. On server
side the ‘‘dynamic composition webservice’’ (Laravel)
represents the computation phase. On client side, the
‘‘dynamic evaluation client’’ represents the presentation
phase. When the website is initially built, all raw reputation
data is handed over to the dynamic evaluation client. Here,
the analytics handler implemented in AngularJS takes all
input data and builds the front-end website involving
interactive visualizations (d3). In order to provide an initial
reputation value, the ‘‘dynamic composition webservice’’ is
called up. It ensures the composition of the computation
engine, the calculation of reputation values and the deliv-
ery of output data to the client. After receiving a pre-de-
fined or user-defined configuration as well as a list of rating
data as input, the workflow engine validates the configu-
ration and processes the defined combination. Here, all
necessary computation components (web services) are
sequentially called up. In our implementation, the dynamic
composition web service as well as all computation com-
ponents (web services) are stored in the central service
repository introduced in Sect. 3.2.1. Once a reputation
value is calculated, the output is sent to the client. A data
exchange between client and server is carried out using
JSON-format. After the initial reputation value is calcu-
lated, the website has loaded completely and is presented to
the user.
Whenever the user starts to interact with a visualization,
the analytics handler directly updates the composition
configuration, sends it to the dynamic composition web-
service and receives an updated output (reputation value)
as an answer. In this way, interactions with the visualiza-
tion can be directly represented in an updated reputation
value.
To give an impression of what interactive reputation
systems could look in practice, this paper presents a
8 http://couchbase.com/.
9 http://laravel.com/.
10 https://angularjs.org/.
11 http://d3js.org/.
Fig. 9 Step 2: A context-based
weighting component is added
allocating a higher weighting
factor to higher prices
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prototype (using real-world data) that was implemented
based on the software framework described above. The
prototype shows an example of how an existing reputation
system could be adapted to enable user interaction.
3.3.2 Prototype: Extension of an eBay-like Feedback
Profile
eBay’s current feedback profile lacks a proper presentation
of transaction context. A malicious seller could, for
instance, build a high reputation selling a huge number of
cheap items but then cheat on the expensive ones (see Sect.
2.2 for the different attack scenarios). This so-called value
imbalance problem has not only been theoretically
described but could also be observed in several real-world
cases. Implementing this attack, a Californian seller man-
aged to deceive victims for over $300,000 (Zhang et al.
2012a). To cope with this weakness, our prototype extends
eBay’s feedback profile by an interactive parallel
coordinates visualization and a bar-chart providing an
overview of the relative share of positive, neutral and
negative ratings.
Similar to eBay, a summary of seller behavior is given
in the top. In the middle, the parallel coordinates visual-
ization (left) as well as the relative share of positive,
neutral and negative ratings in a bar-chart (right) provide
an overview of feedback and transaction context. Below
the detailed feedback is listed. For interactivity, we added a
‘‘context-based filtering’’ component that is called up when
parts of the axes are highlighted through ‘‘brushing’’. The
reputation values (right) are additionally visualized in a
bar-chart. Figure 11 shows an example screenshot of the
prototype. Selecting ranges on the axis of the parallel
coordinates visualization, the polylines displaying tuples
that are not within the specified boundaries as well as the
corresponding reviews are hidden. At the same time, all
reputation values are dynamically updated. In this way,
users can dive into the data and easily reveal correlations
Fig. 10 Schematic view of the architecture
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(Fig. 12 of the case study shows an example where high
price transaction are highlighted).
4 Evaluation
To measure the quality of our concept, several evaluations
have been conducted that involve both a real world case
and an international user study. While the case proves that
interactive reputation systems notably support the detection
of malicious behavior if correctly applied, the user study
provides empirical evidence that this concept is also ben-
eficial for the average end-user.
4.1 Case Study
Actors who profit from the value imbalance problem build
a high reputation by selling cheap products while cheating
on the expensive ones. For this first case study, real world
data from eBay Germany was gathered. The seller feed-
back profile introduced in this case listed 136 positive, 0
neutral and 8 negative reviews resulting in an average of
94.4% positive ratings in the last 12 months. The profile
was found through a thread in eBay’s community boards,
where buyer complained that he had not yet received any
goods although having paid a month ago.
At a first glance, the feedback profile looked okay with
only 8 negative reviews and a larger number of positive
referrals. After starting to interact with parallel coordinates
visualization through brushing of the price axis of prices
higher than 400€, however, this revealed that the seller had
a very high rate of negative ratings (78%) for high-priced
transactions (see Fig. 12). He received negative ratings for
7 of 9 transactions attributed to high prices. All negative
ratings except one involve products of a price higher than
400€. Overall, this seller managed to cheat on a total
amount of more than 12.000€.
The very fact that the malicious seller managed to cheat
on 8 buyers and that his account was still active points out
that eBay’s current seller profiles are not capable of
revealing such attacks. The representation of ratings and
corresponding transaction context in an interactive repu-
tation system, however, is a very intuitive way to support
the detection of malicious behavior and prevent deception
Fig. 11 Screenshot of an example feedback profile for a seller who received 9 positive and 1 negative reviews in the product categories ‘‘Cell
Phones’’ and ‘‘Clothing’’
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(objective 1). By instead using a context-sensitive reputa-
tion metric instead that provides a low reputation value for
high price transaction, malicious behavior might also have
been prevented. A single numerical value, though, could
not have revealed the overall coherence and hence grant
transparency.
4.2 International User Study
The case study described above demonstrates that inter-
active reputation systems can theoretically support the
detection of malicious behavior. However, so far it has not
been experimentally verified that our approach indeed
increases the understanding of reputation data and can be
applied by the average end user. Therefore, a controlled
between-subject experiment12 with 40 UK and 41 German
participants (with different backgrounds and experience) in
which we analyzed the users’ detection ability and under-
standing of malicious behavior in an electronic market-
place (Sänger et al. 2016) was conducted. The study was
carried out at University College London (UCL) and
Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg
(FAU). In order to avoid priming the participants for fraud
detection, they were asked to take part in a ‘‘usability test
of online marketplace features’’. The study was divided
into three phases. In the pre-study phase, the participants
answered some initial questions regarding their experience
with electronic marketplaces. During the main part of the
study, participants had to solve four cases. In each case
they were asked to buy a specific item (e.g. a mobile phone
for 500€), to have a look at the feedback profiles of two
sellers who offered the item and to give a preference for
one seller. One of two sellers was honest while the other
was malicious (participants were not told before to not
prime them for fraud detection). The malicious seller
showed a discriminating behavior for different context
attributes in each case such as a high rate of negative rat-
ings for high price items, whereas the honest seller behaved
consistently within the entire context. The treatment group
used our prototype (new interface condition) while the
control group used an eBay-like interface that did not
involve an interactive visualization and a dynamic repu-
tation value (old interface condition). To obtain an over-
view of the UI, both groups had to watch a short video
introducing the basic functions of the respective interface.
In the third phase, participants were asked about the per-
ceived usability by means of the System Usability Scale
(Brooke 1996). Furthermore participants using the new
interface provided details on the perceived usefulness. At
the end, all participants were debriefed.
Participants were recruited via a standardized participant
recruitment website, an internal mailing list as well as
internal flyering. The age of the participants ranged from
18 to 41 years and 35 were female. For each case, partic-
ipants reported a preference for one of both sellers on a
5-point likert scale with 3 representing no preference. We
recoded the scale to ?2 (preference for the honest seller) to
-2 (preference for the malicious seller). Results show that
the detection ability using the new interface was signifi-
cantly higher13 (77%) opposed to the old interface (56%),
although the same amount of information was presented in
both interfaces (objective 1). A positive value on the
recoded preference scale was considered a correct detec-
tion. Repeating this measure with online buying experience
as a further independent variable, we found that this effect
was even more pronounced. When using the old eBay-like12 The study was conducted in collaboration between Johannes
Sänger (University of Regensburg), Norman Hänsch (FAU), Brian
Glass (UCL), Zinaida Benenson (FAU), Robert Landwirth (FAU) and
M. Angela Sasse (UCL). 13 v2ð2;N ¼ 324Þ ¼ 16:44; p\0:001:
Fig. 12 Seller feedback profile highlighting the review attributed to prices higher than 400€
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interface, inexperienced participants were not able to detect
any malicious behavior in 3 out of 4 cases. Participants
reported their lifetime purchases on electronic market-
places and we used the median cutoff score to categorize
them as experienced or inexperienced.
More importantly, we asked the participants if they
would indeed buy from one of the two sellers or abstain
from buying14. In the new interface condition, only 7% of
the users who decided to buy selected the malicious seller
whereas 85% chose the honest seller. In the old interface
condition, in contrast, 30% endorsed that they would buy
from the malicious seller opposed to 58% who would buy
from the honest seller15. The respective remaining shares
did not give a preference. Table 3 provides an overview.
Furthermore, participants provided oral and written
accounts for their decisions. Here, independent raters
checked whether these reasons contained a priori specified
criteria for determining that one seller is malicious and the
other is honest. A ‘‘Sensemaking Score’’ was calculated
taking the number of mentioned criteria divided by the
number of all possible criteria. We found that users who
used the new interface had a significantly higher Sense-
making Score (0.46 opposed to 0.25) indicating that they
had a better understanding of seller behavior (objective 2).
Finally, we asked participants about the perceived usability
and the perceived usefulness of the new interface. Overall,
participants reported the new system to be superior
regarding a range of characteristics without trade-offs in
usability, suggesting that such a system might be quickly
adopted by users due to its high perceived usefulness.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we introduced the notion of an interactive
reputation system that tries to involve the user in reputation
assessment to increase the users’ detection ability and
understanding of malicious behavior. We first delineated
the generic process model, described how we designed and
implemented the single building blocks, gave details on the
integration of both blocks and presented an example pro-
totype. The evaluation showed that both objectives – the
improvement of the detection ability (robustness) and the
enhancement of the users’ understanding could be met
without trade-offs in usability.
According to Zhang et al. (2012b) – who measured the
robustness of a number of trust models in a recent work –
‘‘the more robust the trust model, the larger the transaction
volume difference between the honest and dishonest duo-
poly seller’’. Reviewing the results of the user study, there
is a difference of 0.78 (85–7% for the new interface)
compared to 0.28 (58–30% old interface) between partic-
ipants who decided to buy from one of the sellers. We
assumed that users with no preference randomly choose
one of the sellers and can thus be left out of consideration.
This leads to an increase of 178% in terms of robustness.
Measures of the Sensemaking Score also indicate an
increase of 84% (0.46 opposed to 0.25) in the sense of
understanding of reputation data.
While the concept of interactive reputation systems is in
the early stages of development, this work provides some
promising insights and a new perspective on how the
robustness of reputation systems could be addressed while
maintaining their transparency. The use of interactive
visualizations for displaying reputation data and involving
the user in reputation assessment proved to be valuable not
only for expert use but also for the average end-user.
Example implementations such as the prototype presented
in this work show that current reputation systems do not
necessarily need to be completely changed, but could also
be extended to interactive functionality. Users reported
such an extension to be very useful as demonstrated in the
user study.
This work also has some limitations: In the evaluation,
the experiments only focused on the usage of one specific
prototype implementing one interactive visualization. Also,
we analyzed the detection of specific attacks. Future
research should therefore involve a larger variety of dif-
ferent prototypes implementing distinct visualization and
interaction techniques as well as other facets of malicious
behavior (e.g. unfair ratings). As the pool of participants
who took part in the user study may not have been a per-
fectly representative sample (the majority had an academic
14 There was no significant main effect on the decision to buy
between both conditions for each case (ANOVA).
15 v2 on the decision to buy revealed that those in the new interface
condition were more likely to select the honest seller
v2ð2;N ¼ 188Þ ¼ 18; 85; p\0:001:
Table 3 Results of the user
study
Measure Old interface New interface
Correct detection of malicious seller 56% 77%
Preferences for honest (of user who decided to buy) 58% 85%
Preferences for malicious (of user who decided to buy) 30% 7%
No preference (of user who decided to buy) 12% 8%
Sensemaking Score [0; 1] 0.25 0.46
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background), further studies using different prototypes as
well as a broader pool of participants may lead to insights
that are even more substantial. Here, it is particularly
interesting if end-users can deal with more complex
interactive visualizations as well as more complex attacks.
Moreover, participants being asked to ‘‘solve’’ cases may
have analyzed the seller profiles more critically than in a
real-life situation. Here, field studies outside of a lab setting
may be a necessary step. Overall, more extensive proto-
typing as well as more comprehensive experiments will
help to complete the design science cycle in an even more
rigorous way.
One further issue that should be covered by future work
are novel attacks and weaknesses that result from dis-
playing reputation data in visualizations or involving the
user in reputation assessment. As reputation systems are
constantly under attack and malicious behavior is con-
stantly adapted to new conditions (new threats may arise),
a detailed analysis of possible new weaknesses may help to
prevent simple exploits.
Overall, due to the practical relevance of this problem
area and the promising outcomes we hope that our work
encourages the conduct of further research on interactive
reputation systems.
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